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Summary 
Truth, trust, integrity and reputation are key concepts for understanding the relationship between 
journalists and public relations practitioners. This the paper: first, considers the current debate on the 
inter-relationship between journalism and public relations; second distinguishes varieties of public 
relations and journalism; third, analyses the Editorial Intelligence controversy; fourth, deconstructs 
aspects of “truth” and “trust” in the context of that debate; fifth, considers why the virtue of individuals is 
vitally important for both public relations and journalism. 
 
Public Relations & Journalism: stereotypes and identity crisis 
In terms of public perception of both professions perhaps stereotypes of the practitioner as 
fundamentally dishonest are widespread. However, those stereotypes of journalism and 
public relations conflate the variety of activities that come under the headings “journalism” 
and “public relations”.  
 
Public relations and journalism: “hard” versus “soft” 
“Soft public relations” is characterised by a concern with providing publicity for a client. By 
delivering a good story the public relations practitioner offers the journalist a means of 
satisfying users of his medium.  “Soft” journalism is concerned with entertainment and truth 
is irrelevant, it is essentially concerned with comics for adults. 
“Hard” public relations and journalism are difficult to characterise simply but are 
characterised by a concern for truth and trust in relation to the integrity and reputation of 
the individual practitioner; 
 
Public Relations and journalism: long spoon or spooning? 
Although a distinction between “entertainment” (“Soft” public relations and journalism) and 
“what matters” (“hard” public relations and journalism) is not regarded as a significant 
distinction by all commentators it provide a locus for deconstructing the role of truth, trust 
and integrity in journalism and public relations  
An important source of “soft” journalism stories is “soft” public relations. The fact is that 
Editorial intelligence primarily suited “soft” public relations practitioners and journalists.   
 
Public relations and journalism:  “truth” & “trust” 
In the case of both public relations and journalism the related notions of trust and truth are 
central to their professional activities. Transparency, truth, trust and public interest are 
dimensions of the relationship between public relations and journalism. 
A hard and soft truth distinction is not exhaustive and an important other category is artistic 
or emotional truth. 
Audiences do not always understand what genre they are witnessing so consequently do 
not automatically know how to interpret what they see and hear. 
 
Public Relations and Journalism:  virtuous expediency   
On the basis of an individual transparently identifiable communicator’s track record 
audiences should decide whether or not to trust that journalists or public relations 
practitioner.  Consequently, there is a need for publics and audiences to be informed so 
that they are able to make valid judgements about communicators and what they say. 
Regarding the relationship between public relations and journalism, at the “hard” end, both 
journalist and public relations practitioner are dealing with matters of public interest and 
need to cooperate but at arm’s length.  
Conclusion 
 “Truth” and “trust” are both important in the practice of journalism and public relations. It is vital, 
therefore, that both “hard” journalists and public relations practitioners act with professional integrity.  
Transparency of the communicator’s identity is crucial. Power needs to rest with a citizen public 
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exercising the right to give or withhold belief in the communicator and in determining his or her 
reputation for veracity and also to exercise real power as consumers and voters. 
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Preamble 
 
In practice notions such as “truth”, “trust”, “public relations” and “journalism” 
are not as straightforward as at first they may appear. The interplay of these 
concepts is considered. The informal logical relationship between truth and 
trust is explored as being recursive: one where the concepts are intimately 
inter-bound so that both need to be understood in order to understand either 
one.  To accept another’s contention that “X” is true” entails trusting them: 
giving one’s “trust” to another entails accepting the truth of what they say. The 
related concepts of truth and trust (Davies, 1998) are both central to the 
professional practice of public relations and journalism and in the relationship 
between the members of both professions.  
 
Thus, the paper: first, considers the current debate on the inter-relationship 
between journalism and public relations; second distinguishes varieties of 
public relations and journalism; third, analyses the Editorial Intelligence 
controversy; fourth, deconstructs aspects of “truth” and “trust” in the context of 
that debate; fifth, considers why the individual virtue of public relations 
practitioners and journalists is of central importance to their professional 
practice. Public judgements about the virtues of the communicator are 
relevant in judging which journalists and public relations practitioners to trust 
as being truthful because ultimately power rests with the public or audience to 
give or with-hold belief in what is communicated. 
 
 
1. Public Relations & Journalism: stereotypes and identity crisis 
 
As with most stereotypes there is an element of truth in the negative image 
that some public relations practitioners and journalists portray of each other. 
The public relations practitioner is portrayed as a paid mouth and spin doctor 
intent on promoting his client’s interests at the price of truth. The journalist is 
portrayed as someone who neither distinguishes between fact and opinion nor 
lets the facts get in the way of spinning a good story. In terms of public 
perception of both professions perhaps those images are widespread which 
may explain why both journalists and public relations practitioners tend to be 
rated poorly in surveys of public esteem. 
 
There are further favourable stereotypes of journalists. In a tribute to such 
journalist Michael Grade commented “They were killed because they were 
doing what journalists ought to do – to speak truth to power. They did so and 
power took its revenge”.  (Grade, 2006).Foremost is the war or foreign 
correspondent risking life, limb and liberty to publish the truth; impartial 
political journalists who constitute the fourth estate; investigative journalists 
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who, in the public interest, expose significant breaches of trust. Possible 
candidates for this role as iconic journalist might include Charles Wheeler, 
Martin Bell or John Pilger, but innate modesty would prevent them claiming 
that title for themselves. 
 
So far as I know, unlike journalists, no public relations practitioner has died 
solely for the sake of exercising his or her profession. However, some may be 
at personal risk from the venom dripping from their pens not to mention being 
briefed against by others. There seems to be no positive stereotypes for 
public relations, which may go some way to explain why many job 
advertisements now tend to advertise “communications” rather than “public 
relations”.  
 
So far as public relations practitioners are concerned there are some 
practitioners and academics who see the role as essentially to do with 
persuasion and selling. This is the view that public relations are essentially 
weak propaganda (Moloney, 2006). They identify themselves as being paid to 
represent the interests of their client or organisation in the most persuasive 
way possible but do not associate personally with the cause they promote. 
This may be candid but morally reprehensible. Other practitioners may see 
themselves more in terms of being engaged in building relationships on behalf 
of their clients and organisations, where the role is not concerned with 
persuasion. 
 
What the stereotypes of journalism and public relations conflate is the variety 
of activities that come under the heading “journalism” and “public relations”. 
This is something which those attacking either profession tend to ignore. They 
tend to latch on to a particular negative view of the opposing profession and 
then attack all the members on a sort of “one size fits all” basis.  Both 
journalism and public relations as professions should increase public 
awareness that neither profession can be summed up in a simplified simplistic 
slur rather than perpetuate and amplify misperceptions and stereo types. 
 
2. Public relations and journalism: “hard” versus “soft” 
 
The relationship between public relations and journalism is complex and it is 
difficult to see the wood for the trees. An approach that may help to clarify the 
situation is to make a somewhat crude distinction between different varieties 
of public relations and journalism. It is possible to distinguish what may be 
labelled “soft” and “hard” varieties of each (the terms “soft” and “hard” are 
simply classification labels).   “Soft” public relations are the sort that is 
effectively part of the entertainment industry where the primary publics 
willingly suspend disbelief and scepticism in order to entertain. “Soft” 
journalism is also part of the entertainment industry, where columnists are 
short on facts and detailed analysis but full on unsubstantiated but amusing 
opinions.  What they say may be witty and we laugh with them or they may be 
buffoons and we laugh at them.  However, what they say is a tarradiddle of no 
real consequence. 
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“Soft public relations” is characterised by a concern with providing publicity for 
a client. It serves publics for whom the truth of what is said is less important 
than the ability of the story to entertain. The range of stories of interest is 
typically narrow and often centres on the activities of celebrities. Often there is 
a close link between the stories and products and services that a client wants 
promoting. By delivering a good story the public relations practitioner offers 
the journalist a means of satisfying users of his medium.  The journalist is 
interested in a story where opinion tends to take precedence over fact. The 
journalist offers the public relations practitioner a means of providing publicity 
for his client. Consequently the relationship appears almost perfectly 
symbiotic. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum there are the “hard” varieties. “Hard 
journalism” is concerned with informing its publics with “true” factually 
accurate independently corroborated information with careful analysis of 
situations and events of public concern. Upholding the public interest is 
central to its practice. It is this variety of journalism that has traditionally been 
identified as “the fourth estate” (Marsh, 2008). 
 
“Hard” public relations are difficult to characterise simply, so what follows is 
yet another attempt at a definition of public relations which draws on 
established public relations theory (Grunig & Hunt, 1984, Ledingham & 
Bruning, 2000).  As a preliminary two terms need clarifying.  
 
An “Issue” (A) is defined as a real or imaginary event identified as yielding 
actual or potential power to affect the well being of people.  
 
An “Active constituency” (B) denotes those who evolve as a pressure group, 
constituency or public because:  
 
• They share a common interest in an issue;  
• Believe in their ability to influence the outcome of that issue; 
• Are prepared to act on that belief. 
 
Given A and B above “hard public relations” is defined as:-  
• The art and social science of identifying and evaluating actual and 
potential: 
o issues affecting the well being of an organisation; 
o primary constituencies relating to that issue; 
• Managing relationships with primary constituencies  
o With a view to winning and maintaining trust whilst paying due 
regard to organisational and public interest through fair dealing. 
o and whenever possible achieving and sharing mutual benefits 
with primary constituencies. 
 
Surveys of public relations practitioners reveal that media relations are still 
regarded by many as an essential aspect of what they do for a living. 
However, there are some senior public relations practitioners who have never 
issued a media release or held a press conference. Again, that indicates a 
wide variety of public relations practice including relationships with the media. 
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Some public relations (in particular consumer marketing public relations) rely 
heavily on a relationship with the media whereas others (for example 
corporate diplomacy) may treat media relations as irrelevant because meeting 
individuals face to face  is the most appropriate means of communicating with 
a small primary audience. 
 
3. Public Relations and journalism: long spoon or spooning? 
 
A general confusion resulting from an inability or refusal to distinguish 
varieties of public relations practitioner and kinds of journalists became 
evident in the 2006 media spat which followed Julia Hobsbawm’s launch of 
Editorial Intelligence (Davies, 2006). If nothing else the media row revealed 
that neither journalism nor public relations may be regarded a homogeneous 
group. However, it also highlighted that the relationships between journalism 
and public relations needs to be understood better. 
 
In the spat over Editorial Intelligence many journalists rushed to claim the 
moral high ground and proclaim their superiority over public relations 
practitioners.  They tended to do this through implicit stipulative definitions 
that stereotype public relations practitioners as sleazy spin doctors and 
journalists as the good guys fearlessly telling it as it is. There were some 
journalists who were more true to their calling and reported the views of public 
relations practitioners about journalists. There the main indictment was made 
against those journalists who filled their columns with opinions and omitted 
any supporting facts. However, all these stereotypes and dichotomies over 
simplified and distorted the question of what both public relations and 
journalism are about. 
 
Although Hobsbawm’s Editorial Intelligence (EI) forum was labelled a 
“backscratchers club” by some journalists it demonstrated that some 
journalists and some public relations practitioners share common professional 
concerns and have a sort of professional symbiotic relationship. The fact is 
that EI suited some but not all public relations practitioners and journalists. 
The media is not exclusively concerned with investigative, political, war and 
foreign hard news stories. Increasingly the media is about providing 
entertainment and at the extreme provides comics for grown-ups 
masquerading as newspapers.  
 
Many public relations practitioners rely on the media to provide third party 
endorsement for what they are selling as well as providing the means of 
reaching a large carefully targeted segment of a market that coincides with 
the users of a particular media product.  Similarly there are journalists who, 
with worries about ever shrinking resources and increasing competition, are 
concerned with maximising audiences and finding stories at the least cost for 
the medium that employs them (Davis, 2008). An important source of such 
stories is public relations. For this group of journalists and public relations 
practitioners co-operation would appear to be a sensible approach to 
business. However, in some cases collusion or cooperation may be contrary 
to the public interest. 
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A distinction between “entertainment” (“Soft” public relations and journalism) 
and “what matters” (“hard” public relations and journalism) is not regarded as 
a significant distinction by all commentators. It may be regarded as a 
distinction without a difference by Michael Grade (Grade, 2007). When 
interviewed about the row in 2007 over the manipulation of footage of the 
Queen at a photo-shoot that was used in a promotional trailer released to the 
media (that The Times headlined as a “Crisis of Trust” at the BBC), Grade 
related the incident to similar contemporary issues in the media, such as quiz 
show scandals, and blamed an influx of young talent into the media industry 
who do not understand the importance of not telling lies to the audience in any 
show, no matter whether it is the news or a quiz show.  
 
It was an audience of University of Westminster public relations 
undergraduates whose vote in the PR Week debate of February 2007 
defeated the motion “public relations has a duty to tell the truth” which 
perhaps supports Grade’s view. He emphasises (Grade, 2007) the 
importance of restoring the trust of audiences and gave the clear message to 
the media “You do not lie under any circumstances”.  However, there is the 
problem that some entertainment, especially that relating to topical events, 
does rely for its success on being economical with the truth. For example, 
some reality television programmes are carefully crafted to enhance their 
entertainment appeal.  
 
So far as the relationship between public relations and journalism are 
concerned Grade does have a strong point. Questions such as the following 
need to be addressed. Should the source of a story be stated? May the 
reader be assumed to know that a story was from a public relations source? 
Does the literal truth of the story really matter or can the media user be 
assumed to suspend disbelief willingly in the interests of being entertained? 
Does the public relations practitioner need to take into account the public as 
well as the paymaster’s interests or is that to apply the wrong sort of 
judgement to what the public relations and media are about?  To what extent 
do all journalists need to be truthful to provide a balanced perspective?   
 
There is also a potential problem of deception where public relations 
practitioners use front organisations (for example, allegedly the Iraqi National 
Congress, whose name has been closely associated with Burson-Marsteller).  
A front organisation is one where a pressure group speaks on behalf of a 
particular interest group but hides its power or financial relationship with that 
group so that what it says appears to be independent third party 
endorsement.   
 
In the case of astroturfing a front organisation mimics what seems to be a 
grass-roots movement.  Since the identity of the principal source of the 
communication is disguised, the lie or disinformation creates a problem of 
misplaced trust. When the identity of the principal is uncovered the public 
should be prepared to punish or reward communicators (individuals and 
organisations) for the personal integrity indicated by their behaviour. In the 
case of public relations the individual is sometimes the messenger or 
spokesperson but more importantly is responsible for the communication 
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strategy and crafting of individual communications.  This penalty would be 
especially effective if used against public relations organisation that hide 
behind the myth that as paid mouths they are amoral technical experts who 
really have no personal tie with whatever their clients communicate. 
 
It is argued that given a differentiation between “hard” and “soft” journalism 
and public relations it is possible to develop a model of journalism and public 
relations that resolves ethical questions that centre on issues of transparency, 
truth and trust and recognises the potentially dominant power of the recipient 
of journalistic and public relations communication. In short, that truth and trust 
are irrelevant for “soft” journalistic and public relations but are of crucial 
importance for the “hard” sort. 
 
4. Public relations and journalism: “truth” & “trust” 
 
 “Truth” as a concept is a necessary condition of knowledge.  However, it is 
also many faceted. For the layperson the success of “science” may be 
ascribed to its concern with and discovery of the truth. In that sense natural 
science may be taken as a benchmark for truth. However, a still strongly held 
principle of scientific propositions is that they should in principle be falsifiable 
(Popper, 1963). In practice scientists have given up the notion that their 
theories reveal absolute truth in any realist sense and now prefer to talk in 
terms of “truthlikeness”.  For science the logical problem is that there is no 
way of proving assertions about all possible cases. For example that all 
swans are white, as Popper (2004) pointed out, a single counter example is 
sufficient to disprove a universal proposition. Universals cannot be verified but 
may be falsified.  
 
The history of scientific theories has often been one in which a theory is found 
to be lacking in some significant way and has either been modified or 
replaced by another that took a fresh perspective on the problem.  That is not 
to say that science is not concerned with truth but rather that scientists accept 
the brute fact that its propositions are similar to rather than identical with “the 
truth” in any absolute sense.  Scientific knowledge no longer provides the 
benchmark or examples of unequivocally true propositions but its theories are 
subject to empirical evidence. With the yard-stick of scientific theories 
discarded as a paradigm the concept of truth has become hazier but the 
criterion of empirical evidence remains vitally important. 
 
That natural science does not deal in absolute truth would appear to allow 
significant wriggle room for those who feel generally uncomfortable with the 
notion of “truth”. The approach of social epistemology is concerned with the 
social dimension of what can be known. On an extreme interpretation this 
approach effectively does away with distinctions between knowledge and 
belief. Questions of truth are reduced to “who” tells it rather than “what “one 
believes. Applied to the media, factual news reporting would appear to have 
no more intrinsic currency than a columnist‘s opinion. 
 
The success of an empirical approach to scientific knowledge as it developed 
from the European Enlightenment has been that claims to the truth of an 
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assertion have been subject not only to the tests of logic and reason but also 
to empirical evidence. Eric Hobsbawm observed “the rise of ‘postmodernist’ 
intellectual fashions in Western universities…..which imply that all ‘facts’ 
claiming objective existence are simply intellectual constructions. In short, that 
there is no clear difference between fact and fiction. But there is, and for 
historians, even for the most militantly anti-positivist ones among us, the 
ability to distinguish between the two is absolutely fundamental” (Hobsbawm, 
1993).  
 
An alternative perspective to Popper is the realist paradigm developed by 
Bhaskar (1997) who argues that objects of scientific knowledge are not 
reducible to social constructions but have an independent reality in which the 
real is what is causally efficacious. However, despite significant difference 
between Bhaskar’s position and Popper’s, both agree on the crucial point that 
empirical evidence on the way the world is places a  physical and logical 
constraint on what is possible. That is “hard truth” is not simply a matter of 
interpretation and that there are clear limits as to what can be regarded as 
“true”. As Sokel and Bricourt (1998) observe, “One does not need to be a 
strict Popperian to realise that any theory must be supported, at least 
indirectly, by empirical evidence in order to be taken seriously”.   
 
A modern historical example of where ideology rather than empirical evidence 
was taken as the arbiter of truth is the biological theories and career of 
Tromfin Lysenko. (Roll-Hansen, 2005). Stalin’s ideological and political 
support of Lysenko’s ‘barefooted scientist’ Lamarkian teleological biological 
theories (in the face of overwhelming contrary empirical evidence) resulted 
not only in eminent biologists who rejected Lysenko’s ideas being imprisoned 
in the Gulag but also to the starvation of probably millions of people. 
 
The inadequacy of Lysenko as a scientist lay not in his contention that 
acquired characteristics were inheritable but in his refusal to admit the 
possibility of any evidence that would falsify his theories. There is a vital 
difference between his approach and that of modern geneticists who as 
Darwinists believe in natural selection as the mechanism for evolution but who 
accept the need to respond to contradictory empirical evidence. For example: 
the grandchildren of children who suffered in the Dutch famine following the 
second world war are smaller than their grandparents; statistical evidence 
from Swedish records is that the grandsons of men who have suffered famine 
in childhood are better adapted to dealing with food shortage than their 
grandfathers. It seems that events have in someway affected the DNA of one 
generation and caused change in a subsequent generation. Genetic scientists 
do not deny the evidence but regard it as facts that require explanation. 
 
 In both the Dutch and the Swedish cases the evidence appears to support 
the model of an acquired characteristic being inherited. However, Darwinist 
natural scientists do not deny the evidence out of hand because it appears 
contrary to their fundamental scientific beliefs. For natural science the critical 
debate takes place mainly through peer reviewed articles (such as Landman, 
1991). The possibility that a theory is in principle falsifiable is perhaps even 
more the touchstone of the empirical status of a theory than its predictive 
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power. Natural science progresses by its reference to empirical evidence 
rather than by adherence to ideology however attractive.  
 
A central problem for using empirical evidence as the arbiter of truth is that 
often the evidence is not immediately available. A current biological issue is 
the safety and actual benefits of genetically modified plants. The “naturalness” 
of genetic modification was an issue even when achieved through selective 
breeding (Shakespeare, 1982). However, modern techniques, such as the 
use of a virus to transfer genetic material, that speed up the selection process 
are treated by European publics with caution because of their unknown 
possible unintended side effects. The way in which science develops is not 
simply a question of empirical evidence but also a product of social 
institutions. 
 
Whereas modern natural scientists reject teleological explanations there is a 
place for that approach in the social sciences concerned with explaining 
institutions and the behaviour of people. That distinction also requires a 
different use of the notion of “rule” or “law” between the physical and social 
scientist. For the natural scientist at its strongest a “causal relationship” 
means constant conformity of the physical relationship between related 
events that is explicable by a theory that is testable by a crucial experiment 
whereas in social science sense “laws”, “rules” and “conventions” may be 
interpretations and evaluated by a wholly different criteria that are non-
positivist and often teleological.  
 
In explaining human actions the teleological language of motives and 
intentions is perhaps (von Wright, 1971) more appropriate than causation in 
its sense in the natural sciences. However, for journalism and public relations 
questions of truth are concerned with factual assertions that are empirically 
verifiable in principle if not always immediately.  However unlike natural 
scientists those professions are concerned with individual events rather than 
with universals. In that sense they have a similar relationship with hard truth 
as does the law. In the case of the law issues raised by participants’ intentions 
is perhaps well illustrated by the judgement in the Spanners case (Chambers, 
2008). In that case the empirical facts of who did what to whom and with what 
effect were not in dispute and the defences’ case focussed on the intentions 
of the participants. In this paper the primarily concern is with problems centred 
on the notion of empirical truth of specific events not with social interpretation. 
That is not to say that questions of motives and intention are never relevant to 
public relations, journalism or the law but they are outside the ambit of the 
current discussion. Here we are concerned with truth as brute facts that are at 
least in principle empirically verifiable. 
 
In terms of every-day and legal discourse, “true” and “truth” still have clearly 
definable uses. In courts of law people routinely attempt to distinguish 
between what is truthful from lies and deceit in order to determine what 
happened. Modern science reveals that the body in the Dr. Crippen case was 
male and consequently Crippen’s conviction was unsafe. (Graef, 2008). If we 
are initially wrong or confused as to whether a claim is true the later addition 
of evidence can often clarify our judgement. In court a witness is still required 
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to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.  However, in court 
false witness may be given or empirical evidence wrongly interpreted.  
 
The truth of the evidence is central to the uncertainty surrounding the trial of 
Mervin Touchet, 2nd Earl of Castlehaven, for assisting in the rape of his own 
wife and for committing sodomy with his servants. Herrup’s (1999) verdict on 
his trial and execution is that “His obscurity made any accusations against him 
plausible, his legal acuity (however fortuitous) made his acquittal dangerous, 
and his obstinacy made his death inevitable”. In other words, was he was 
convicted on the basis of a construction or interpretation of a social context 
rather than by reference to objective verifiable evidence?  In such legal cases 
an absence of “hard” evidence requires the jury to trust the word of one 
person against that of another. 
 
Castlehaven’s trial prompts the question whether the “facts” found by the jury 
were really a “hard truth” justified by what really happened or were they a “soft 
truth” of socially constructed reality? In the latter case the evidence against 
him was a tissue of lies constructed by his wife and son in order to frame him 
and his execution judicial murder. Significantly Herrup notes that 
“Prosecutorial recitations are lessons of applied social theory, not speculative 
exercises. Whether done cynically or sincerely, the simplest way to 
communicate with jurors is to remind them of what they already believe”. 
 
Early modern trials were less about proving than testing – testing the 
character of the defendant, the impartiality of the jury and the powers of 
repentance (Herrup, 1999). The character or social judgement of the integrity 
of the accused appears to have outweighed the objective evidence. Personal 
reputation could literally be a matter of life or death and in some cases 
perhaps still is. Children are still socialised through being told fables such as 
Aesop’s tale of the boy who cried “wolf”. In our relationships with other people 
we make judgements about the way the social world is. In terms of personal 
virtues someone who demonstrates a propensity to act with “integrity” is 
generally valued by others through having a good reputation ascribed.  
 
As a moral virtue integrity is dissimilar from say “courage”. To demonstrate 
courage one acts in a brave way in circumstances which challenge the action. 
Courage may for example be demonstrated by a soldier throwing his body on 
a grenade to protect comrades when an instinct for self-preservation may 
dictate putting a safe distance between oneself and the explosion.  On the 
other hand personal integrity as a moral capacity is not demonstrated by a 
particular sort of act but rather by an association or group of principles 
brought together in a whole.  A propensity to tell the truth would normally be 
included within this association of propensities or character traits of an 
individual. 
 
Bernard Williams (Williams, 2002) observes that “Truthfulness implies a 
respect for the truth. This relates to both of the virtues that, I shall claim in the 
following chapters, are the two basic virtues of truth, which I shall call 
Accuracy and Sincerity: you do the best you can to acquire true beliefs, and 
what you say reveals what you believe”. In terms of William’s criteria, those 
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journalists and public relations practitioners who do not have a respect for the 
truth also lack what he identifies as virtues of accuracy and sincerity. 
 
There may be, however, a variety of kinds of “integrity”.  For example a 
novelist or an actor may exhibit “artistic integrity” but the former does so by 
creating a fiction and the latter by creating a character. In both cases it is an 
illusion, impression or image that has been created. In neither case is what 
has been created “true” in its everyday empirical sense.  However, both artists 
are concerned at least with creating a make-believe world that engages and 
perhaps entertains others. At their most revealing they may also realise 
eternal truths about the human condition. That is, their effect is in some way 
cathartic (Aristotle, 1996). In practice this is not a problem so long as one 
knows in which domain which one is operating. For example one would not 
challenge Jane Austen’s veracity on the basis that she wrote Mansfield Park 
or Ian McKellen’s because he portrayed King Lear. 
 
We can cope with the fact that the characters and events Austen wrote about 
and McKellen portrays have meaning (intensions or connotation) but that they 
do not designate actual or real objects or events and so have no extension or 
denotation. That, what they were doing would not count as a lie or deceit to be 
judged by empirical criteria for truth. On the other hand someone who thought 
that Daniel Defoe was an eye-witness journalist rather than a novelist may be 
deceived by the Journal of the Plague Year into believing that the characters 
and events were fact rather than fiction; that they once had extension as well 
as intension and so were in principle empirically verifiable.   
 
In his time Defoe was engaged in both journalism and public relations. It is 
perhaps significant that the subtle use of irony once landed Defoe in the 
pillory and attacked by both sides. The defence “Actually, I was only play 
acting” would seem rather weak for a defendant arrested for brandishing a 
gun in a bank and demanding that the cashier hand over money. Play-acting 
and irony out of context can be interpreted as deceit which may or may not be 
entertaining and may have lethal consequences if misinterpreted.  
 
The problem of Defoe writing fiction in a journalistic style is similar to that of 
the modern documentary maker. Is the documentary simply a chronicle or a 
report of events or is it in some way also an artistic work which arouses the 
emotions and leads the viewer or listener to emotional insights? Michael 
Grade would appear to concur with the view that a documentary should 
adhere to the empirical truth (Dowell, 2007) but that would seem to distort 
what many acclaimed documentary makers who treat the genre as an art form 
are about. For documentaries, and historical accounts in a tradition stemming 
from Herodotus, there is an issue about the extent to which they should be 
regarded as an art form allowed artistic licence and the extent to which they 
constitute factual reporting. It is important that the audience understands the 
conventions of the genre in order to make sense of what they see and hear.  
 
With the ease of digital manipulation the camera today can quite easily lie. 
The criterion of “hard truth” is often applied rigorously to photo-journalists but 
on the other hand British newspapers routinely remove body parts from 
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photographs of terrorist bomb outrages on the grounds of public taste and 
decency. The sight of disembodied heads, limbs and torsos apparently does 
not mix well with a full English breakfast.  
 
For journalism there is also the issue of distinguishing fact from opinion. In 
practice blurring the distinction often makes for a more entertaining and 
therefore commercially viable story. Newspapers such as the Sun lay claim to 
telling hard news, with headlines such as "GOTCHA. Our lads sink gunboat 
and hole cruiser," or in the subsequent edition “"Did 1,200 Argies drown?". 
Rupert Murdoch was reported a saying that he didn’t see the need to change 
the headline, which perhaps justifies Private Eye’s spoof Sun headline "KILL 
AN ARGIE AND WIN A METRO". David Yelland (Marsh, 2008) admits that as 
the editor of the Sun “As soon as you start to look at both sides of an 
argument you know you are in the wrong job”. That places obvious limits on a 
publication exercising a well founded and balanced concern for the public 
interest. 
 
Often the truth is not “soft” but neither is it “hard” in Dowell’s (2007) sense of 
empirical truth. However, the modern apparent prevalence of “soft” truth 
stemming from entertainment genres such as docudrama and reality 
television has tended to cloud the picture. Sometimes the genre is not 
transparent, which may add to its value as entertainment. However, fairy- 
stories traditionally ape the truth by beginning “once upon a time” rather than 
“the events in this tale are entirely fictitious”. Often it is not entirely clear into 
which category, balanced factual account or fictitious entertainment, many 
docudramas and newspaper reports fall.  
 
The naïve view that writers must be devoted to separating fact from opinion 
and telling the truth needs to be qualified. Fiction writers, such as poets or 
novelists, may be using a fabricated story to express a truth about the human 
condition. In that case we may concur with Coleridge’s comment - “That 
willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith”. 
In order to gain the intrinsic value from a piece of writing we may need to turn 
off our empirical or common sense critical faculties. In a similar way, we may 
be willing to suspend disbelief in order to be entertained by a joke. Since 
much of the joke is in the telling, Hoffnung’s story of the wheelbarrow full of 
bricks would fall flat, if when he began someone interrupted by asking “but is it 
true?” A story may contain very little literal truth but the point of listening is not 
for information but to be amused or entertained by a confection and where 
audience trust in the journalist is irrelevant. A significant problem for readers 
of much of contemporary British journalism is the challenge of distinguishing 
“soft” entertainment from “hard” journalism. 
 
The reason for reading some journalists is for pure entertainment. We trust 
them to write something entertaining, regardless of its actual truth and do not 
judge them on their factual accuracy. In that case they are more fiction writers 
than news reporters.  Sometimes the stories originate from public relations 
practitioners, as in the startling 1986 Sun headline “Freddy Star ate my 
Hamster”. So far as entertainment is concerned the doings of soap opera 
characters provide public entertainment that spills over from the fiction of 
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television to news reports in the media. In the case of the big brother house, is 
what is shown to be read as fact or fiction? It is often difficult, perhaps 
impossible, with some newspaper pieces for the reader to deconstruct the 
genre to which a particular piece belongs. 
 
One wonders whether the readers would be any less entertained if the soap 
opera characters were avatars and the reports of their “real life” doings pure 
fantasy.  However, there is a vague or fuzzy line between the fantasy world of 
soap opera and the media portrayal of the lives of celebrities. Celebrities 
seem to have a dual function of providing entertainment as well as providing a 
reality check that a life style to which some aspire actually exists. In that 
sense disbelief is partly lifted but the expectation is that what the journalist 
says is empirically true so that the real possibility of the celebrity’s lifestyle 
may be endorsed. 
 
It is perhaps at the blurred edge where fantasy and reality are not clearly 
distinguished that problems of the public interest arise. For example, what 
makes it permissible to persuade other people that you have a spray that will 
engender trust in others? Or if the claim is that eating a particular food will 
protect one from getting cancer? What if the person being persuaded is a 
child or adult with reduced mental faculties? Is there a point at which there 
should be a declaration that a claim is not empirical truth but fiction? Is there a 
need for transparency in the claims made by journalists and public relations 
practitioners, or would that destroy the enjoyment that comes when we 
suspend disbelief in order to be entertained? These are apparently difficult 
cases but perhaps most could be dissolved given a sufficiently critical and 
informed audience evaluating what is said by public relations practitioners and 
journalists. 
 
In his last book (Williams, 2002) Bernard Williams identifies “two currents of 
ideas that are very prominent in modern thought and culture”. The first is a 
pervasive suspiciousness against being duped and looking for the underlying 
rationale behind the surface of what is said. The second is a pervasive 
suspicion of truth itself. “Whether there is such a thing; if there is, whether it 
can be more than relative or subjective or something of that kind”. In 
identifying those features of contemporary society Williams has identified a 
significant problem for us when considering the relationship between truth, 
trust, journalism and public relations. 
 
In the case of both public relations and journalism the related notions of trust 
and truth are central to their professional activities. At a simple level most 
journalists require that the reader believes their story is true; most public 
relations practitioners aim to gain a primary public’s trust through a belief that 
what is said is true.  It is possible to use the distinction to modify an 
established argument (Berkley and Chadwick, 1995) to the effect that truth 
telling is a constuitive end of “hard” journalism that distinguishes it as a 
practice from entertainment, or “soft” journalism.  However, as Williams 
implies, a central concern of both media and public relations publics is that of 
protecting themselves against being duped.  Winning trust, (despite promises 
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that a spray of oxytocin will almost magically immediately bestow it) is a 
complex business that engages truth. 
 
In considering the relationship between truth and trust Hollis (Hollis, 1998) 
identifies personal integrity as key evidence for assessing another’s 
trustworthiness. He remarks “Whether there is finally a difference between 
predictive and normative trust is not straightforward. There is clearly some 
difference between my predictive expectation that you will be punctual (since 
you always are) and my normative expectation that you will (since courtesy 
demands it). The one prompts me to trust you and the other entitles me to do 
so.  They may come together when we reflect that whether you will do as 
courtesy demands depends on your character and circumstances, and so on 
your desires and beliefs”.  
 
Lehrer (1997) draws our attention to the fact that “trustworthy” is not an 
absolute concept. It is not the case that someone is either trustworthy or they 
are not. He notes “When a speaker affirms that someone is trustworthy, one 
understands the speaker as affirming that the person in question is 
trustworthy for the listener to whom the remark is made. This is important 
because trustworthiness is a relative notion in the sense that a person can be 
trustworthy for one person and not for another…” This distinction is important 
because it may help to explain why a (“soft”) public relations practitioner who 
publicly boasts of lying is still able to survive in his professional role. However, 
that boast also conjures the memory of Tom Johnston’s cartoon where the 
careers advisor says “Wiggins, you live in a fantasy world of lies and deceit, 
have you ever considered public relations?”  
 
In different areas of (“hard”) public relations an admission of being 
untrustworthy would probably terminate a career or a business. Trust is the 
basis, perhaps a precondition, for the development of a mutually beneficial 
relationship (Parsons, 2004). A very robust approach to truth and trust tends 
to be taken in some business areas such as the financial sector. The auditors 
and accountants Arthur Andersen lost reputation, credibility and trust in the 
backwash of the collapse of Enron and as a result a major firm employing 
thousands of people worldwide collapsed virtually overnight.   
 
In the financial and commercial sector transparency is often given as a key 
prerequisite for gaining trust. In the fifteenth century merchants swearing an 
oath had to do so with their hands above board and in plain view so they 
could not cross their fingers. For a public relations practitioner engaged in 
investor relations compromised professional integrity could spell ruin.  
However, some commentators such as Anthony Hilton now cast doubt on the 
integrity of corporate communicators in a culture that has moved from one of 
personal relationships to that of corporate institutional selling. 
 
In her Reith lectures on trust O’Neil (O’Neill, 2002) commented “Transparency 
certainly destroys secrecy: but it may not limit the deception and deliberate 
misinformation that undermine relations of trust. If we want to restore trust we 
need to reduce deception and lies rather than secrecy. Some sorts of secrecy 
indeed support deception, others do not”.  That is an important distinction 
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because sometimes transparency can blind observers to a deception. 
Company published accounts are communications where the information to 
be provided is closely specified by law. However, the apparent transparency 
of the information failed to safeguard an apparently informed public from the 
deceptions of creative accounting (Smith, 1996). Transparency is not 
sufficient to protect against deception. If a problem is that transparency 
encourages unjustified trust how far is it worthwhile achieving? 
 
In important matters of gaining trust the deceiver is parasitic on the teller of 
“hard” truth. In the long run one may often with the help of additional and 
corroborating information be able to discern the “hard” truth despite attempts 
at deception and cover up. However, perhaps it is for the historian rather than 
the investigative journalist to unravel the “hard truth” over current mysteries 
such as operation copper green (Hirsh, 2004). Perhaps for the “hard” news 
reporter it is a largely a matter of luck in finding an individual with the integrity 
and courage to whistle blow (in the vein of Deep Throat or Joe Darby) that 
allows knowledge of some events to enter the public domain while they are 
still current. Through the adept use of the shredder and the delete button it is 
perhaps likely that much of major significance will never reach the public 
record either as history or through investigative journalism. 
 
It has been argued that journalists’ revelations are not necessarily in the 
public interest. An argument put forward by O’Neill in her Reith lectures is 
challenged by Peter Osborne (Osborne, 2006). He claims that “O’Neill 
maintains that the power of the media in the twenty-first century is a danger to 
society because it destroys the trust that must exist if institutions are to work”. 
He concludes “At the heart of her argument lies an overwhelming arrogance: 
that voters and the users of public services are not fit to know the truth and 
must be content to rely on the judgement of an elite who know better than 
they do what is good for them”. Osborne draws attention to the relationship 
between transparency, truth, trust and public interest which need to be 
dimensions in considering the relationship between public relations and 
journalism. An essential role for “hard” journalism is reporting and 
commenting on issues of public concern where revelations may destroy public 
complacency grounded in misplaced trust. 
  
5. Public Relations and Journalism:  virtuous expediency  
  
Institutions such as newspapers, broadcasting companies and public relations 
consultancies are no more than legal fictions manifested through human 
agents. It is individuals who are trusted or not as moral agents.  A suggested 
approach to reforming the professional behaviour of some BBC journalists is 
through the provision of ethical training for journalists together with a stronger 
regime of monitoring and enforcement.  A similar regime could perhaps be 
adopted by public relations consultancies that wanted to be above suspicion. 
However, an organisation is a fiction and its actual ethics and values typically 
reflect those of its dominant coalition. If individuals lower in the hierarchy are 
seen to misbehave and are justly punished (rather than simply scape-goated 
for making operational the actual values of their superiors who then disown 
them) that sends a clear signal about organisational values. 
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For “hard” journalism and public relations transparency of the identity of the 
communicator is of paramount importance. That which matters from the 
perspective of the media user or public relations audience is the identity of the 
individual communicating.  Audiences and publics should disregard “soft” 
communicators and judge the extent to which a message should be given 
credence from the perceived trustworthiness of the individual making the 
communication. This would preclude “soft” public relations practitioners hiding 
behind the “cleft stick” that they were simply advocates for their client’s cause 
and so avoiding moral responsibility for what was communicated.  Public 
relations practitioners sometimes claim a parallel with diplomacy, that one is 
an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country. It may be bad form to 
execute the herald or messenger but in a metaphorical sense to preserve the 
integrity of “hard” public relations it is a necessity.  
 
An individual journalist with a by-line can be identified and may stand or fall on 
what (s) he says or endorses. In 1985 Hugh Trevor Roper, an eminent 
historian and director of the Times, endorsed as authentic the Hitler diaries. 
His obituary in the Independent began “LORD DACRE of Glanton, the 
historian who as Hugh Trevor-Roper authenticated the fake "Hitler Diaries", 
has died.” The fake diaries were to be published in the Sunday Times. At a 
stroke, his reputation was damaged catastrophically and with it the trust by 
many in his professional judgment. His professional reputation was 
compromised severely, perhaps irreparably.  It is personal reputation that both 
journalists and public relations practitioners should put at risk where they 
trade professionally on their personal integrity as individuals. 
 
A similar situation to the fake Hitler’s diaries case may occur in public 
relations where an individual investor relations officer makes a critical error in 
what is said and so forfeits trust in his or her judgment.  However, there are 
perhaps more apparently difficult cases where transparency is absent.  The 
identity of the public relations practitioner or the journalist responsible for a 
communication is not always on the public record and this lack of 
transparency means that normal sanctions of withdrawal of reputation or trust 
cannot be applied so there is at best a weak basis for the public to give 
credence to what is said.   
 
It may be argued that commercial confidentiality prevents public relations 
practitioners from being transparent in all the work they do for clients. 
However, that leaves open room for the suspicion that they may, say, 
undertake propaganda for foreign regimes and organisations that is not really 
in the British public interest.  However, under a precautionary principle, where 
the identity of the communicator is not transparent then assent by the public 
should be with-held.  As a corollary the prudent spectator would reserve 
judgement on any communication where the identity of the person 
communicating is not certain and clear.  If the message does not come from 
an identifiable individual who is a trusted source then it should be treated with 
suspicion and assumed untrue in the absence of reliable independent 
corroboration (and since people are sometimes mistaken even a trusted 
source is suspect).  
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At present it is possible for an individual journalist or public relations 
practitioner to hide behind the cloak of anonymity. Whenever communicating 
the individual journalist or public relations practitioner should put his or her 
personal reputation at risk and ideally only those with an adequate reputation 
would be regarded as credible. Audiences could then, on the basis of the 
communicator’s record, decide whether or not to trust communications from 
individual journalists or public relations practitioners. In order to protect their 
personal reputations both professions would have a special interest in 
verifying that what they said was true.  
 
The contention is that questions of credibility and trust only relate to “hard” 
public relations practitioner and journalists.  Also, that the credibility of the 
“soft” varieties” is irrelevant. What is required is a robust approach to the 
professions of both journalism and public relations where the credibility and 
integrity of individuals is crucial for the in “hard” variety and the “soft” sort 
dismissed as purely entertainment not raising issues of trust.  
 
Power lies with the public or audience who bestow their trust or belief not with 
the communicator who has to earn it. The present decline in public trust in 
broadcast media is more an opportunity than a threat. However, in order to 
realise the potential there is a need for those publics to distinguish a 
favourable impression created by a slick presentation from what is actually 
credible. It is therefore essential that the publics are able to make well 
founded judgements of what is communicated. 
 
People will not always judge others accurately. There will be false positives 
and false negatives of deceivers believed and truth tellers disbelieved but that 
is not to undermine the validity of the approach of encouraging honesty and 
integrity in significant communication. Some people are simply gullible and 
give their belief and trust too easily without evaluating and weighing the 
evidence.  However, access to the objective evidence is not always 
straightforward and often the way to interpret the evidence at a specific time in 
not wholly clear, as is perhaps the current case with genetically modified 
crops and global warming. That uncertainty makes it even more important that 
relevant communications from public relations and journalism are reliable. 
 
At the “hard” end, both journalist and public relations practitioner are dealing 
with matters of public interest. At the “soft” end then the journalists are 
concerned with producing comics for adults and the relationship that they 
have with faceless public relations practitioners is neither here nor there. It is 
important that individuals as sources of information are transparent so that the 
credibility of what is said may be assessed in relations to his or her reputation.  
In particular, the public needs to apply the rule, never trust a liar. In this 
context lies would include anything intended to deceive including weasel 
words. Journalists and public relations communicators need to be regarded in 
the same fashion.  That way serious (“hard”) public relations practitioners and 
journalists would have a keen professional reason for not misleading their 
audiences.  
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The prevailing model of the relationship between the media and publics who 
use it for information and entertainment is that those public are consumers. 
However, a useful distinction is drawn between consumers and citizens by 
Gabriel and Lang (1995). They note that “Choosing as a citizen leads to a 
very different evaluation of alternatives from choosing as a consumer”. 
Citizens, they claim, have: to argue their views; defer to the majority; balance 
personal rights and duties; play and active role in the community; engage with 
the views of others. They conclude “As a citizen, one must confront the 
implications of one’s choices, their meaning and their moral value”.  What this 
model does reject is the idea of the consumer fulfilling his or her role as a 
citizen through the exercise of choice in purchasing. At its core being a citizen 
is a moral function whereas being a consumer is not. A corollary of that 
relationship is that whereas the potential power of an individual as a 
consumer depends on personal wealth or spending capacity as a citizen each 
has an equal right. 
 
The distinction of the media publics between consumer and citizens is a 
powerful analytical tool. It may be that in the cases where the communication 
is pure entertainment and the truth “soft” then the consumer role is perhaps 
appropriate for those that use the media. However, where the truth is “hard” 
then there is a case for arguing that role of responsible adults needs to be that 
of “citizen” when using the media. However, that is not to idealise the role of 
the citizen was as consumer also exerts the power of the purse. 
 
There is a case for the introduction of special legal protection against deceit 
for the young and mentally infirm in the case of selling but in other ways they 
will remain vulnerable.   However, for citizens at large education has role by 
encouraging a more rigorous and questioning attitude towards both journalism 
and public relations. To that extent the public will get the media and public 
relations it deserves. It also requires publics to reward communicators with 
integrity and punish individuals who lack it. In terms of the media that may be 
achieved by citizen readers no longer buying the newspaper or watching the 
programme as when the Sun was consumers boycotted in Liverpool after 
reporting on the 1998 Hillsborough disaster. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The relationship between public relations and journalism is worth considering 
for the practical reason that both professions have a significant influence on 
the modern world. Also, consideration of the relationship between journalism 
and public relations provides insights into the nature of public relations. Much 
of the debate on the relationship between public relations and journalism 
recently conducted in the media has been based on simplified stereotypes of 
both professions where the protagonists have constructed a man of straw to 
be demolished. The characterisation of the other profession has tended to be 
more a confirmation of the writer’s past prejudices than a realistic attempt to 
move the debate forward.  
 
In the debate between journalist and public relations practitioners there has 
been a lot of name calling but not a lot of hard analysis. There is a need to 
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develop analytical tools that help clarify the issues. It is also important to avoid 
platitudes because the problems are complex and entertainment value is not 
a pre-requisite of coverage. Contributions to popular current affairs 
programmes such as Radio 4’s Today programmes sometimes cut short the 
discussion because a point is seen as too complex or difficult for the listeners 
to grasp, which is  perhaps why they may be better treated in academic 
journal articles.  In the popular media the emphasis is typically on instant 
accessibility at the expense of considered thought and analysis, although this 
may be partially overcome through more sustained coverage on 
accompanying web pages (which may herald a new style of hybrid-media) 
that may encourage better informed judgements by the public so long as 
“hard” journalists replace those who simply collate others’ postings. 
 
The “hard” “soft” distinction is important for defending the reputations of both 
professions. As a profession public relations’ reputation stands to be 
damaged when the activities of a practitioner of “soft” public relations are 
regarded as representing all public relations and “soft” journalists label them 
as “P.R. Guru”.  A similar distortion may have occurred for journalism when 
Julia Hobsbawm attracted “hard” journalists to the advisory board of her 
editorial intelligence forum. Editorial Intelligence is suited to “soft” journalism 
and “soft” public relations. It is at the “hard” end of both journalism and public 
relations where empirical evidence and a concern for the truth as well as 
personal integrity are significant in determining a personal reputation for 
credibility. 
 
It is vital, therefore, that both “hard” journalists and public relations 
practitioners act with personal professional integrity. That includes a full 
regard for the truth but it also includes not developing relationships with 
members of the other profession that compromise the professional work of the 
other. However, reciprocal truth, trust and transparency are necessary for 
them to co-operate in their arms length day to day relationships. For both 
journalism and public relations the personal integrity of “hard” practitioners is 
not an optional extra or feel good factor, it lies at the very essence of their 
professional practice. 
 
Finally, the need is for an informed sophisticated public of citizens with power 
as consumers capable of recognising various media genres and public 
relations practitioners for what they are and able to interpret and evaluate 
them appropriately. They also need to distinguish whether their personal role 
in relation to what is communicated is that of consumer or citizen. Where the 
true source of a communication is not transparent then a default position of 
public mistrust is not a crisis for society but is rather a glimmer of hope that 
audiences and publics have recognised the need to be wary of what and in 
whom they believe. The effect of greater individual accountability for both 
public relations practitioners and journalists would be preferable to the general 
distrust and disregard in which both professions are held currently. To 
safeguard the public interest we need “hard” public relations practitioners and 
journalists with integrity but also an audience of vigilant citizens. 
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